Uncertainty Ahead For Ukraine And Iraq

What Ukraine can expect this winter

By Tuesday, the Russian military was claiming to have recaptured some territory in eastern Kharkiv after a Ukrainian counteroffensive had pushed Russian forces back. As far as we can tell, the Russian victory in retaking Kharkiv only includes one small village-Gorobiivka.

But while Moscow is talking of a small gain in the Kharkiv region, pro-Kremlin officials were fleeing Kherson by Wednesday amid a Ukrainian advance. This is a key development considering that Kherson was one of the first territories Russian forces had occupied in the invasion. While the Ukrainian counteroffensive continues to push out Russian forces from occupied territory, the blowback for this is a missile barrage on utility infrastructure that is designed to make for an extremely difficult winter for Ukraine.

What we expect going forward now that Russia has been wrong-footed by Ukraine's counteroffensive is an increased momentum of missile attacks as Putin's ground troops falter and untrained recruits prove not up to the task.

This strategy has already begun in the form of kamikaze drone attacks on Kyiv, using drones supplied by Iran.

Starting in September, at about the same time as the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that saw Ukraine win back territory in the east occupied by Russia, Moscow and Tehran held talks about arms supplies. Putin has been gunning for more weapons from Iran, and it now appears that his requests are being fulfilled with drones and short-range and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles.

These Iranian weapons are likely to target key Ukrainian infrastructure this winter, with energy (particularly electricity) infrastructure being the prime target. Kyiv is already preparing for blackouts and restricting energy use in advance.

We expect the further emergence of a hybrid war now, targeting not only Ukrainian infrastructure intended to make the winter unbearable, but also raising tensions in the North Sea around oil and gas installations-phase one of which we have already seen, with two undersea explosions and weeks of continuing illegal drone activity, one such incident which has seen the son of a close Putin ally arrested this week.

Winter is the key, with the EU ban on Russian seaborne crude set to go into effect on December 5th.

A deceitful calm in Iraq

In Iraq, while there is a false sense of calm in the wake of the election of a new president that ends the government paralysis in place since 2020, we are not convinced that the power struggle is over.

Al-Sadr won't agree to a new Iraqi government, so what does that mean for security-and oil-when the influential Shi'ite cleric has militia backing and the ability to summon tens of thousands of protesters with a whisper?

Last week, Iraq elected a new president who immediately nominated a PM-designate. Just days later, al-Sadr representatives said the cleric and his supporters would not join the new government to be formed by PM-designate Mohammad Shia al-Sudani. Al-Sudani only has 30 days to form a new government. It will be a highly critical 30 days for Iraq, and possibly for oil markets.

Al-Sudani is closely tied to former Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki, al-Sadr's key rival. It is this rivalry that has seen mass protests and violence in Baghdad, which spread earlier this month to oil-rich Basra, where various militias and their backers have access to oil revenues.

Al-Sudani was nominated for PM back in July, too. It didn't work then, either. Al-Sadr's protesters stormed parliament that time, leading to months of on-and-off violence.

Al-Sudani is attempting to sell himself as "independent" from al-Maliki, but the Sadrists are unlikely to buy this, which would lead to a repeat of this summer's deadly violence.

This is all about resource control, or rather, the money each faction receives from various industry "rents". This summer, Al-Sadr feared that Al-Sudani as PM would mean putting a Maliki man on the throne, which in turn would threaten the Sadrists' access to "rent". As far as we can see, nothing has changed to suggest that Al-Sudani no longer poses a threat to al-Sadr.

While al-Sadr's political moves are really all about maintaining access to funding, he does serve as a buffer against pro-Iranian forces, and has also a cross-sectarian element, with Sunni groups and Kurdish groups under his umbrella.

The successful appointment of al-Sudani as PM-designate, however, is a blow for the Sadrists and suggests they have lost their footing somewhat. But that increasingly desperate situation is likely to result in more desperate actions, such as the unleashing of mass protesters once again, and possibly a move to destabilize oil-rich Basra.