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OPEC’s Trillion Dollar Mistake

OPEC’s Trillion Dollar Mistake

A few days after Christmas I appeared on CNBC Asia’s Squawk Box to discuss the volatility in the oil market. Bernie Lo asked a question about OPEC’s strategy, and I characterized their decision to defend market share as “a big, costly mistake” that had already cost the group over $500 billion in 2015 and would likely cost them that much again in 2016.

I followed that appearance up with an article for Forbes called OPEC’s Trillion-Dollar Miscalculation (which went viral and received more than 100 times the traffic of their typical energy article). In that article I detailed the numbers behind my assertion.

Two weeks later, Continental Resources CEO and shale drilling pioneer Harold Hamm went on CNBC and reiterated my argument. He called OPEC’s strategy “a monumental mistake for them, I might add, a trillion-dollar mistake.” While there were a number of responses to Hamm’s comments that displayed varying degrees of schadenfreude over the huge decline in his net worth, I didn’t see much acknowledgement that the point is correct. So let’s review. Related: Saudi Aramco Chairman Talks Oil Down

By the time of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, OPEC’s share of global oil production had been rising for years. In 1973 OPEC was producing more than 50 percent of the world’s oil. But in response to the embargo, countries all over the world implemented a number of changes to gain back some degree of energy security (addressing both supply and demand side), and OPEC’s market share went on a decade-long decline. By 1985, OPEC’s share of global oil production had fallen to 27.6 percent, but by 1995 it had once again risen to above 40 percent. In 2008, just as the shale oil boom in the U.S. was beginning, OPEC’s share reached 43.8 percent.

From 2008 to 2014, the U.S. added nearly 5 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil production to the market. This lessened the U.S. need for OPEC’s oil, and by 2014 OPEC’s share of global oil production had fallen slightly to 41.2 percent in 2014.

Historically OPEC — and more specifically Saudi Arabia, which is responsible for over 30 percent of the group’s oil production — has functioned as the world’s swing producer for crude oil. If the world needed more oil production, OPEC could usually bring more barrels online. If the world needed less, some could be idled. The group often stressed the need for a stable oil price to ensure that global supply met global demand. Related: Oil Crash Only The Tip Of The Iceberg

Because they were losing market share — but perhaps more importantly because they saw that trend continuing — that strategy was abandoned at their November 2014 meeting. It was then that OPEC announced they would defend market share that was being lost due to the rise of non-OPEC production, especially from the United States. Some have argued that OPEC had no choice but to defend market share instead of cutting production to balance the market, but I disagree. I think Saudi Arabia pushed for a strategy that will go down as one of the greatest mistakes in OPEC’s history. It was a decision, I might add, that 9 of the 13 OPEC members reportedly oppose.

To review, crude oil had shown signs of being oversupplied in early 2014, and by summer prices had started to soften. By the time of their November 2014 meeting, the price had dropped from about $100/bbl in mid-summer to ~$75/bbl. In making their decision, I think OPEC believed that oil prices could fall somewhat below $75/bbl for a short period of time, and that would be enough to bankrupt a lot of the shale oil companies and allow OPEC to recapture market share. Instead, the shale oil producers slashed costs, and while some producers have gone bankrupt — and other bankruptcies are undoubtedly on the way — shale oil production has proven to be much more resilient than the Saudis and OPEC expected. It is declining at a much slower rate than they anticipated.

After that November 2014 meeting the Saudis were committed, and they have reiterated their strategy at 2 subsequent meetings. To change strategies now would be to admit they had been wrong. Following that initial meeting and the 2 subsequent meetings, oil prices have dropped to lower and lower support levels. As a result the annual difference in the price OPEC is getting today for their crude, and the price they were getting prior to their November 2014 meeting is over $500 billion per year for the group. Related:U.S. Land Rig Count 22 Jan 2016

What other choice might they have made?

At the time of their decision, the global markets were probably oversupplied by 1-2 million bpd. If OPEC had merely decided to remove 2 million bpd off the world markets — only 5.5 percent of the group’s combined 2014 production — the price drop could have easily been arrested and maintained in the $75-$85/bbl range. That would have still given them 38.9 percent of the global crude oil market. For that matter, a production quota cut of 13 percent could have removed from the market a volume equivalent to all of the U.S. shale oil production added between 2008 and 2014. (Whether the Saudis could have actually enforced those quotas is another matter).

Why didn’t they opt for that course of action?

I think the single biggest reason is that they were concerned that the shale oil boom would continue to expand, with production not only continuing to grow in the U.S. but in other countries with shale oil resources. It was a legitimate concern, but I think the shale oil boom in the U.S. would have peaked in a few years. With the world’s demand continuing to grow, OPEC could have just tightened up a couple of times to maintain price, and then waited for declining shale production to give them back market share.

OPEC of course reasoned that it didn’t make sense that they, the low cost producer, should cut production which would prop up higher cost producers. After all, that does seem backwards. But there is a risk in that strategy. If the higher cost producers slash costs in an attempt to survive (which they undoubtedly would), OPEC could suffer through a period of much lower prices. That is in fact what has happened.

OPEC has claimed several times that their strategy is working because U.S. shale oil production is falling. But the only way the strategy actually works is for OPEC to get back to the cash flow levels they had prior to 2014. They are a very long way from achieving that.

Should OPEC go on to gain back market share, and should they manage to maintain higher margins as a result, their strategy could pay off in the long run. The one big thing they have going for them is that they still control 72 percent of the world’s proved crude oil reserves — 1.2 trillion barrels. If they ultimately manage to sell those barrels and earn a few dollars more per barrel as a result of their current strategy, it could amount to trillions of dollars. (Note that because proved reserves are a function of price and available technology, their reserves estimates may plummet back to what can be produced economically at a price of $30/bbl. That will nullify much of Venezuela’s heavy oil reserves).

If OPEC’s strategy does ultimately pay off, it will be many years before it does so. It will require a huge recovery in the price of oil. It won’t be easy for them to earn back the trillion dollars in foregone revenue for 2015 and 2016. At this moment in time, it is hard to conclude that it was anything other than a big, costly miscalculation on their part. I also expect that’s what the history books will eventually say.

By Robert Rapier

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  • Canvan on January 26 2016 said:

    You have made a good case for cooperation between OPEC and Russia, because otherwise this was a lost cause from the start. Could that be the reason for the seemingly irrational behavior of the Saudis?

    Either they eventually win the production war by flooding the market with low-cost oil, and if that failed to eliminate enough high-cost producers, then alternatively their strategy would be to frighten OPEC and non-OPEC producers (like Iran and Russia) into a really inforcable agreement on rational production levels leading to $70pb oil. Are the Saudis trying to create a larger "cartel" and using their strategy to show how seriously infractions would be dealt with?
  • NomadWizard on January 26 2016 said:
    Bogus assumptions. Sour grapes. Ussa propaganda. Pretty sure it was just the cost of doing business for the Arabs. It will take years for the shale-oil production to get back on it's feet. Shale-oil suffered far worst. Arabs would have stopped the bleeding by now, if that was the case.
    Besides the banks/ussa government/FED manipulated things in there failed attempts to fight back. Oil companies and ussa tax payers will be paying for the games, not to mention the losses from defaults from the oil hedging.
  • Leo Kobrinsky on January 26 2016 said:
    Too many words, too little truth in that article. US oil came in the market in the last 7 years for only 2 reasons: high oil price and US government printing money. The only way for Saudis to fend off that pest is to make it starve with low prices. There is nothing else Saudis can do and they have to go the very end of that fight. The winner will be the one who stands on his feet eventually.
  • Douglas on January 26 2016 said:
    I did the numbers and sent them to an analyst in Washington DC, a fellow at CSIS. I argued for a tariff as a measure of protection from a cartel that was telling the world that allah was now setting the oil prices. Everyone in this mess but the US had something to gain. Russia, Iran, China and Saudi Arabia. I argued that a strong and assertive US Congress (and they wonder why we want a Trump) should argue for a tariff of $60 dollars. He said NO, that all tariffs were a tax on the consumer. Yet, in the same breath, oil below $60 is "bad" for the US economy. Confused? Me too. He held his ground. But one thing I did was the math and no matter what SA was to gain by this act of terrorism against the US energy and banking system, it was going to cost them between 1 and 1.8 trillion in revenues. We fought a major war for less. It would take the US energy sector defaulting on their energy loans together with pumping oil at losses for three years for SA to gain enough market to stand their ground. One problem....SA doesn't have any more production to give to the markets because they are producing "flat out". Let's face it, as the numbers set in like a bad flu, it is the Saudi Arabian mathematicians that forgot the consequences of their strategy. Someone there apparently flunked math before statistics class. The answer is that this was a very poorly executed strategy that was made for other reasons than geopolitical or market share. It was most likely a decision made on a personal bet in a Western bordello. And our President actually bowed down to these kissed these morons ...ring. Does anything make sense in the Middle East?
  • Ana Langsdon on January 26 2016 said:
    More than OPEC it was Saudi Arabia who led this insane strategy. Most other countries urged the Saudis to cut production which they refused. Now, they too are going insolvent which will destabilize the region even more. This strategy is going to lead the world economy to a mayor collapse, probably by the end of this year. So enjoy the lower gas prices, by this time next year the world economy will be in a tailspin.
  • puddi on January 26 2016 said:
    The article does little to back up the assertion in the title. The question presented to the Saudis in 2014 was, what price of oil to defend? It is by now indisputable that $100 was too high. Four continuous years at at that price had prompted record E&P investments across the entire industry, not just shale though that became the poster child. To maintain $100 oil, the Saudis would have to cut output again in subsequent years as other high-cost projects came online. The article speculates that this would have run its course in a few years. The Saudis evidently thought otherwise. For my money, I’d bet that the Saudis had access to the higher-quality industry data and intelligence.

    It’s interesting to consider why oil prices stayed high for so late in the game, even when, by the beginning of 2014, signs of oversupply were apparent. Evidently, oil producers individually put their faith in OPEC, specifically SA, saving the day for them. This was wishful thinking, likely the result of awareness that there was no alternative market-balancing mechanism other than the very unpleasant one going on now.

    It’s quite possible that the Saudis, along with everyone else, assumed that oil production would be more sensitive to a drop in price, so that oil would have gracefully leveled off in the $70 range within a year. On the other hand, since the survival of companies is at stake, they individually have no choice but to pump every drop of oil that generates the tiniest bit of cashflow. Therefore, the Saudis may have anticipated a two-year effect.
  • CZ on January 26 2016 said:
    Indeed, several remarks by Saudi officials and oil advisers prior to the November 2014 OPEC decision make it clear that the Saudis thought that the high marginal cost of US shale would establish a floor around $80/b, low enough to slow US tight oil production. The consequences of maintaining the production ceiling were totally unintended.

    In the last two years, Mr Al Naimi statements and actions reveal an astonishing number of errors of judgment which he tries to justify with rather nonsensical rationalizations. One has to ask if this 80 year old man still has his full intellectual capabilities.

    Initially, the argument that the Russians need to participate in a cut was a pretext for not cutting. Later, it became a justification and now it's has become a face saving issue for Mr Al Naimi. Besides, there is also an antagonism between the GCC countries and Iran/Iraq about market share within OPEC, which became apparent in the last meeting but was simmering before.
  • B Bragg on January 27 2016 said:
    Maybe they just don't like unconventional oil and gas like all the suffering citizens in USA and Australia. In Australia, the de -watered coal seams are now bleeding methane everywhere but up the drill holes. A major catastrophe. Also fracking is mobilising light hydrocarbons in the coal seam itself, contaminating water. Finally, landholders totally reliant on bore water (no surface water on driest continent on earth) have had bore drops of 20-30 meters -another catastrophe. Perhaps the towel heads just hate frackers like the rest of us!
  • Billions and Trillions on January 27 2016 said:
    When you talk about billions and trillions - are you talking US (trillion is 1,000,000,000,000 - one thousand times one billion) or European (trillion is 1,000,000,000,000,000,000O - one million times one billion.)?
  • Shane on January 28 2016 said:
    Defending an oil price of $100 was simply never going to work for SA. Had they cut 2mbpd, the US, Canada, China, and all sorts of other places would be throwing money into oil projects like crazy. Enough to replace the Saudi 2mbpd and then what? SA cuts production again?

    The only price they can defend, is one that is too low to attract massive amounts of new investment. In other words, they can't defend $100, but they could probably defend $60 just fine. At $60 shale might hold steady, but its not going to to crazy building out new fields.

    So now that we're sitting in the $30 range, they can cut enough to get the price back up to $60 then just wait for world demand to push it higher. They won't leave it at $30 though. At that price nations start to look at collapse.

    Also SA won't cut alone. If Russia doesn't cut SA won't cut. SA has the cash to last for years, Russia does not. SA knows this and would probably be happy to burn cash waiting for Russia to implode.
  • Iree on January 29 2016 said:
    Interesting write-up and discussions. Stripped of all embellishments, the issue is simple, more for less or less for equivalent. Saudi pumping 8 million daily at US$30 receives US$240mm/day. Saudi reduces to 6 million per day, price jumps to US$40mm/day; Saudi receives the same US$240mm/day and keeps the balance of 2 million daily oil for the future generations. , This is simple arithmetic; however, movement of oil prices is known to not follow any logic. despite the fact that production had been relatively stable, new oil is almost equal to decline in existing producers, prices nose dived to about US$10 in the late 90's only to jump to US$30 in early 2000's without any major subtraction from the market. Could it be this will be repeated now also?

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